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Abstract: 
Recent preliminary references to the CJEU on online keyword advertising and registered trade mark 
infringement have exposed the challenges facing EU registered trade mark law in its response to new 
technologies. These cases and the challenges they pose provide a timely prism through which to 
examine the European trade mark law-making process and the role of the CJEU within that process. 
This article will employ an analysis of the way in which the CJEU has developed certain key new 
aspects of the law on ‘infringing use’ to explore concerns over the CJEU’s role and approach. It will 
be argued that, driven by policy considerations, the CJEU has acted creatively to develop the law of 
infringement in ways which cannot be sustained by the TMD and CTMR and which are likely to 
cause increasing uncertainties going forward. With the European Commission currently considering 
reform of Trade Marks Directive 2008/95/EC and Community Trade Mark Regulation 
207/2009/EC, this paper will argue that there is a need for more comprehensive and forward-
looking legislative intervention than has yet been proposed and that such intervention will be 
essential to restoring balance in the European trade mark law-making process.  
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Introduction  
The Trade Marks Directive (‘TMD’), approximating EU national registered trade mark laws, was first 
enacted in 1988; the Community Trade Mark Regulation (‘CTMR’), creating the unitary Community 
Trade Mark, followed in 1993. 1 In all this time, however, aspects of trade mark infringement have 
remained highly contested. Claims relating to referential use of a mark, identifying the goods or 
services of its owner, and for damage to branding, rather than to the mark as an indicator of origin, 
remain particularly controversial.  
European trade mark law now also faces increasing challenges from new technologies, particularly 
the Internet. From a trade mark perspective, the key commodity exchanged online is information. 
According to research referenced by the European Commission, half of Europeans using the 
Internet do so to search for information before buying on- or offline. 2 Searching against a trade 
mark allows Internet users to find sources of goods or services, product or price comparisons, 
reviews and alternative or complementary offerings. This can increase consumer choice and 
competition, but undermine a trade mark owner’s efforts to protect his brand. In the online 
environment, expansive trade mark protection collides with increased scope for communicating with 
consumers, exacerbating tensions between infringement, control of information and the role of trade 
marks as important points of reference for consumers, competitors and third parties. 
The recent wave of preliminary references before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’) on trade mark infringement and keyword advertising, from the three joined cases of Google 
France in early 2010 through BergSpechte, Eis.de, Portakabin and eBay to Interflora in late 2011, exemplify 
the challenges posed by these developments. 3   Between them, the keywords cases examined the 
liability of the search engine and advertiser in relation to the reservation of a registered mark as a 
keyword without the trade mark owner’s consent.  Attitudes of national courts had varied 
considerably and there was a pressing need for clarity, particularly given the importance of keyword 
advertising revenues to search engine business models. 4  
There are, however, real difficulties in applying the TMD and CTMR to keyword advertising, 
inherited both from their drafting and from CJEU case law. The CJEU has been exceptionally active 
in trade mark law, giving judgment in over a hundred preliminary references involving trade marks. 
Although under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and 
its predecessor Treaty provisions the Court’s role is to ‘interpret’ the TMD and CTMR, its trade 
marks case law has at times attracted concerns that its judgments are, in effect, ‘invention in the guise 
of interpretation’. 5    
Analysis of the way in which the CJEU tackled the keywords cases provides fresh insight into the 
present state of law-making in the European trade mark regime and its response to the challenges of 
new technologies. This paper will explore concerns over the CJEU’s role in that law-making process, 
focussing on two particularly important and controversial issues at stake: first, locating and allocating 
responsibility for infringing ‘use’ of the disputed mark; and second, determining whether there is 
damage to the mark’s ‘functions’ for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) TMD infringement, the detail of 
which is explained further below. Ultimately, the infringement claims failed against the search engine, 
but remain open against the advertisers. Whatever view taken of the merits of this outcome, this 
paper will argue that the way that these issues were dealt with by the CJEU reveals a concerning level 
of judicial creativity by the Court. It will be argued that, driven by policy considerations, the CJEU 
has developed the law of infringement in ways which cannot be sustained by the TMD and CTMR. 
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This results in uncertainties likely to trigger more references to the CJEU and, in turn, further judicial 
creativity in response. The European Commission is currently considering amendment of the TMD 
and CTMR; this paper welcomes this, but argues that legislative intervention on infringement must 
extend beyond the proposals in the ‘Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark 
System’ prepared for the European Commission by the Max Planck Institute (‘the Max Planck Study’) 
in order to seize this important opportunity to modernise the law in a way which will also restore 
balance in the European trade mark law-making process. 6 
 
Issue one: infringing ‘use’ – who, what, where, when?  
Google France: the questions referred and the Court’s response 
The first step in every trade mark infringement claim is identification of the allegedly infringing ‘use’ 
of the disputed sign. This act of ‘use’ constitutes, to adopt the language of intellectual property 
litigation, the ‘infringing act’ to which liability will attach if the other requirements for infringement 
are met. For all forms of infringement in the European regime, there must be ‘use’ of the infringer’s 
sign in relation to goods or services ‘in the course of trade’. 7 A non-exhaustive list of acts constituting 
‘use’ is provided at Article 5(3) TMD. 8 Properly locating the act of infringing ‘use’ is essential to 
determining the nature and basis of the claim, parties, jurisdiction and remedies.  
In the non-digital world, this had not presented any particular legal difficulties. This changed, 
however, with the complexities of keyword advertising. In keyword advertising, an advertiser 
contracts with a search engine provider for a ‘sponsored ad’, consisting of hyperlink, Internet address 
and short promotional text, to appear on-screen at the same time as the provider’s natural results if 
the chosen keyword is entered as a search query by an Internet user. In most cases referred, the 
‘sponsored ads’ themselves were lawful marketing, not mentioning the disputed mark, for legitimate 
goods and services. There is typically no limit to the number of advertisers who can ‘reserve’ the 
same keyword, priority between their advertisements determined by the amount paid.   
While advertisers including disputed signs in their on-screen advertisement clearly ‘use’ those signs in 
a classic sense, it was less clear whether and, if so, how there is ‘use’ of the sign by an advertiser who 
simply contracts with the provider for an otherwise infringement-free advertisement to be displayed 
in response to the inputting of the disputed keyword by an Internet user.  At the same time, while the 
provider clearly ‘uses’ the sign in a technical sense in processing search inputs, matching them against 
stored keywords and displaying advertisements in the event of a match, such activities are ‘invisible’ 
and result in the display of content provided by the advertiser which may not mention the trade mark 
at all. To complicate matters, in Google France the defendant, Google, had itself suggested some of the 
disputed keywords, including combinations with words such as ‘imitation’, ‘replica’ and ‘copy’, by an 
automated tool called the ‘keyword generator’. This listed keywords reserved by others and the traffic 
generated by them, allowing prospective advertisers to identify keywords likely to produce useful 
returns.  So, while Google was in some instances passive in accepting keywords nominated by 
advertisers, in other instances it proactively suggested them, albeit on an automated basis.  
In Google France, the referring court, the French Cour de Cassation, characterised the potential 
‘infringing acts’ of the  provider which it wanted the CJEU to analyse in language covering both the 
passive and proactive aspects of Google’s service, asking whether there was infringement in 
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‘mak[ing] available’ keywords to advertisers and/or ‘arrang[ing] by the referencing agreement to 
create and favourably display’ advertising links on the basis of selected keywords. 9 The CJEU, 
however, reformulated the questions referred and characterised Google’s role purely as a passive one 
in which the disputed keywords were ‘chosen by clients of the referencing service provider and 
accepted and stored by that provider’ (emphasis added). 10 The CJEU then responded by introducing a 
new and hitherto unknown ‘own commercial communication’ test:  
Although it is clear… that the referencing service provider operates “in the course of trade” 
when it permits advertisers to select, as keywords, signs identical with trade marks, stores 
those signs and displays its clients’ ads on the basis thereof, it does not follow, however, 
from those factors that that service provider itself “uses” those signs... 
 
In that regard, suffice it to note that the use, by a third party, of a sign identical with, or 
similar to, the proprietor’s trade mark implies, at the very least, that that third party uses the 
sign in its own commercial communication. A referencing service provider allows its clients 
to use signs which are identical with, or similar to, trade marks, without itself using those 
signs. 
 
That conclusion is not called into question by the fact that that service provider is paid by its 
clients for the use of those signs. The fact of creating the technical conditions necessary for 
the use of a sign and being paid for that service does not mean that the party offering the 
service itself uses the sign. 11 
 
The CJEU immediately concluded, without further discussion, that ‘a referencing provider is not 
involved in use in the course of trade’, whereas the advertisers were. 12   
 
The new ‘own commercial communication’ test – what are the difficulties and what do they 
reveal?  
 
The CJEU did not follow the Advocate General, who concluded that the disputed signs were ‘used’ 
by Google. 13  The CJEU’s ruling has been welcomed by commentators. 14 Concerns had been, and 
continue to be, expressed about the implications of over-extension of trade mark law into the field of 
Internet search and the potential chilling effects if search engines face liability for keyword-triggered 
or, worse, natural search results.15  The references also had wider implications for other on- and 
offline scenarios and intermediaries.16  
 
In creating the ‘own commercial communication’ test, however, the CJEU imposed new meaning on 
the word ‘use’ that narrows the previously well-accepted concept of ‘use in the course of trade’. This 
new meaning is not inherent in the natural reading of the word ‘use’. It cannot be justified on a literal 
reading of the TMD or CTMR, nor does the CJEU attempt this.  There is, however, also no attempt 
by the CJEU to justify the ‘own commercial communication’ test purposively by reference to 
anything in the overall scheme or objectives of the TMD or CTMR or, indeed, on any other basis. 
There is no explanation for the new test at all. Instead, the CJEU simply ‘notes’ that it is ‘implied’. 
From what is not unexplained.  
 
The brevity with which this major issue was disposed of by the CJEU and the absence of any 
justification for the new test raises suspicions of a policy-driven move to remove Google from 
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liability, rather than one grounded in the TMD or CTMR.  Such suspicions are lent support by the 
shortcomings of the new test which quickly become apparent on further examination of Google France 
and the somewhat selective re-use of this test by the CJEU in subsequent cases. 
 
For example, a requirement that an infringing use must be in the defender’s ‘own commercial 
communication’ conflicts with the CJEU’s previous case law making it infringement to use a mark 
not only in relation to the defender’s own goods and services but also those of third parties.17 Even 
applying the new test it is hard to see how the CJEU could have concluded that there was no ‘use’ of 
the disputed signs by Google as a referencing provider.  Reformulating the questions referred to 
focus only on Google’s passive activities led the CJEU to ignore the keyword generator for 
infringement purposes. This tool - intended to maximise uptake of the ‘Adwords’ service – must 
surely go further than merely ‘creating the technical conditions’ which are ‘necessary’ to enable 
keyword use by advertisers, constituting instead a ‘commercial communication’ by Google promoting 
its own services. 18 The omission of this tool from the CJEU’s infringement analysis sits uneasily 
with the Court’s discussion, in the same case, of the provider’s entitlement to protection under 
Article 14 E-Commerce Directive (‘ECD’), in which the CJEU specifically identified the role played 
by Google ‘in the establishment and selection of keywords’ as one of several matters pointing away 
from entitlement to protection. 19  
 
The CJEU has also struggled to apply the ‘own commercial communication’ test coherently in 
subsequent preliminary references involving intermediaries. In eBay, the CJEU applied the test to find 
that eBay, as provider of an auction site platform, did not ‘use’ trade marks appearing in seller 
advertisements on that site. 20 In Red Bull, however, the CJEU did not mention the ‘own commercial 
communication’ test in assessing the liability of the provider of a drinks can filling service, sued for 
infringement in relation to the filling of cans bearing allegedly infringing signs. Instead, the CJEU 
ruled that the service provider did not ‘use’ the disputed signs inter alia because it merely executed a 
technical part of the production process ‘without having any interest in the external presentation of 
[the] cans’, its service was ‘not, by its very nature, comparable to a service aimed at promoting the 
marketing of goods’ and the provider was ‘not apparent to the consumer, which excludes any 
association between its services and [the] signs’.  21 This is hard to reconcile with Google France and 
eBay, where Google and eBay both had interests concurrent with their clients in the presentation of 
their clients’ advertising, were involved in promotional activity and were clearly identifiable to 
consumers. The factors applied in Red Bull would have pointed towards, not against, findings of 
liability on their part. It is now not clear what are the relevant criteria, on- or off-line. 
 
Such difficulties are also apparent in the CJEU’s treatment of keyword advertisers. The CJEU made 
no attempt in Google France to explain what the advertiser’s ‘own commercial communication’ is said 
to comprise.  It is, however, not self-evident what, in simply purchasing a keyword, the advertiser is 
said to be ‘communicating’ or to whom. Recognising this, the Advocate General considered there to 
be no ‘use’ by the advertisers as their actions had no consumer ‘audience’. 22  
 
An opportunity subsequently arose in the Interflora reference to clarify how the actions of the 
advertiser are said to constitute infringing ‘use’, the English High Court having asked specifically 
whether such ‘use’ lay in the advertiser: selecting or nominating the relevant sign as a keyword; 
associating the sign with the URL of the advertiser’s website; setting the cost-per-click which the 
advertiser is prepared to pay in relation to the keyword; scheduling the timing of the display of the 
keyword; or using the sign in correspondence with the provider about the invoicing, payment for and 
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management of its account. Again, however, the CJEU reformulated the question referred, merging 
it together with other questions forming part of the reference to read: 
 
[T]he referring court asks, in essence, whether… the proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to 
prevent a competitor from displaying – on the basis of a keyword which is identical to that trade 
mark and which has been selected in an internet referencing service by the competitor 
without the proprietor’s consent – an advertisement for goods and services identical to those 
for which that mark is registered (emphasis added). 23 
 
To rewrite the question in this way is unhelpful. The advertiser himself never ‘displays’ anything, nor 
is the act of ‘display’ within his control: he has no control over where or how his advertisement will 
appear on-screen and, if a ‘broad match’ option has been selected, he even has no prior control over 
when his advertisement is displayed.24  The reservation of a keyword and the display of the keyword-
triggered advertisement are separate acts.25    Although the inconsistency with Interflora is not 
acknowledged, the CJEU itself has recognised this separation in its later Wintersteiger judgment, holding 
on the issue of identifying the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ in a cross-border infringement 
claim that (emphasis added):  
 
In the case of an alleged infringement of a national trade mark registered in a Member State 
because of the display, on the search engine website, of an advertisement using a keyword 
identical to that trade mark, it is the activation by the advertiser of the technical process displaying, 
according to pre-defined parameters, the advertisement which it created for its own commercial 
communications which should be considered to be the event giving rise to an alleged infringement, and not the 
display of the advertisement itself. 26   
 
Having rewritten the question in Interflora, the CJEU immediately moved on to discuss trade mark 
functions (below) with no consideration given to the specific acts identified by the High Court.  No 
mention is made of the ‘own commercial communication’ test even though this was clearly called for 
to respond to the reference.27 Indeed, this test has not been mentioned again by the CJEU in any of 
its post-Google France decisions on keyword advertisers (BergSpechte, Eis.de, Portakabin and the keyword 
advertising limb of eBay). This is unusual given the CJEU’s habitual practice in trade mark cases of 
reciting at length its earlier case law. We are left with no explanation from the CJEU as to how the 
act of purchasing a keyword constitutes an ‘own commercial communication’, no way of reasoning 
by analogy to apply this test to other scenarios and a strong sense that the CJEU rewrote the 
question referred in Interflora to avoid the difficulties apparent in any attempt to reconcile this test 
with the reality of the keyword reservation process.  
What are the broader issues underlying the CJEU’s approach to the ‘use’ requirement? 
It has been observed by commentators that: 
 
The Court sometimes… chooses to reformulate a question in such a way as to make it 
unnecessary for it to decide on controversial or doubtful questions of law. 28  
 
In the keywords cases, CJEU appears to have done just this to avoid difficult questions the answers 
to which did not fit its overall conception of the allocation of responsibility for infringement.  
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The TMD and CTMR prima facie capture all acts of ‘use’ which take place in the course of trade, 
whatever the nature of the responsibility attaching thereto. The CJEU was, however, clearly of the 
view that, at a policy level, actionable responsibility should lie with the advertiser only and not the 
search engine. This ties into the broader question of whether trade mark infringement should cover 
what might more properly be regarded as secondary infringement. 29  Although discussed by the 
Advocate General in Google France, 30 the CJEU did not explicitly acknowledge this issue and instead 
manipulated the meaning of the word ‘use’ in an unspoken attempt to carve out acts equivalent to 
contributing to or facilitating infringement from the European trade mark regime. In so doing, 
however, it offered no justification - literal, purposive or otherwise - for reading such a carve-out into 
the TMD and CTMR, taking a one-sided view of the provider’s activities and struggling to articulate 
the basis upon which the advertiser as ‘primary infringer’ is liable. 31  
 
If we accept the CJEU’s policy objectives as valid, we must also accept that to achieve the clear-cut 
removal of Google from liability the Court was forced to innovate.  32  There is no literal, purposive 
or other basis in the TMD or CTMR for removing any class of secondary-style infringers from 
liability. Indeed even if the desired outcome was the opposite, to find Google liable in all instances, the 
TMD and CTMR do not easily permit this.33 This is not a case of judicial creativity to address an 
ambiguity or lacuna in the law: it is simply that the only outcome achievable without judicial 
innovation was one which was not clear-cut, with traditional analysis resulting in Google being possibly 
liable but only on certain bases depending on the facts of the case. 
 
Google France is a blunt instrument, taking a markedly more dramatic approach than the ECD which 
does not provide intermediaries with any absolute defences. While there are clearly important 
interests in maintaining open Internet search, commentators have noted that it may be ‘dangerous’ to 
remove search engines completely from the scope of trade mark law. 34  In the meantime, we face 
fresh uncertainties on the issues discussed above and continued fragmentation of outcomes as it is 
left to non-harmonised national laws to determine whether there is any other form of liability against 
the provider, through national secondary liability rules or on other national law grounds. Given that 
national courts are also to decide the applicability of Article 14 ECD, the risk of divergence magnifies 
further in conflict with the Commission’s aim of developing a legal framework for intermediaries 
‘which guarantees legal certainty’. 35  
 
All of these factors highlight the need for clarification of the definition of infringing ‘use’ and for 
legislative intervention to tackle specifically and transparently the position of intermediaries in terms 
of trade mark infringement liability. The hasty construction in Google France of the ‘own commercial 
communication’ test and the subsequent difficulties encountered by the CJEU applying this test 
show how inapt it is to attempt to take on such issues within the guise of interpreting the current 
language of the TMD and CTMR.   
Issue two: trade mark ‘functions’  
Background – Article 5(1)(a) TMD 
If an act constituting ‘use’ of a sign can be established, a claimant must go on to prove the remaining 
elements of an infringement claim. Having removed the search engine provider from the picture as 
discussed above, in the keywords cases the CJEU proceeded to address these elements in relation to 
the advertisers. Although not exclusively, the keywords cases have tended to focus on Article 5(1)(a) 
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TMD, the ‘core zone’ of protection, 36 which provides that it is infringement to use without consent 
in the course of trade a sign which is identical to the registered mark in relation to goods or services 
identical to those for which the mark is registered.   
A key further requirement in Article 5(1)(a) cases is that the infringing act must be one which 
damages the so-called ‘functions’ of the registered mark. The ‘functions’ analysis of Article 5(1)(a) 
has its roots in the recitals of the TMD and CTMR and the CJEU’s judgment in Arsenal, where the 
Court held:  
[T]he exclusive right under Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive was conferred in order to enable 
the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that 
the trade mark can fulfil its functions. The exercise of that right  must therefore be reserved 
to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of 
the trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of 
the goods.  37   
Although mentioning the ‘functions’ of a mark in the plural in the passage quoted above, in Arsenal 
the CJEU focussed solely on damage to the ‘essential function’ of the mark as a ‘guarantee of origin’, 
which the Court held was affected if the infringer’s use of his sign was such as ‘to create the impression 
that there is a material link in the course of trade between the goods concerned and the trade mark 
proprietor’. 38  The ‘essential function’ aligns with ‘what is universally acknowledged to be the core of 
the way in which trade marks function: their ability to allow consumers to distinguish between the 
goods of different undertakings’. 39  
Although the subject of much discussion in the literature and in Advocate Generals’ Opinions, for 
several years no CJEU judgment identified or gave protection to any other trade mark functions in 
the context of Article 5(1)(a). 40 This position changed dramatically, however, in 2009 when the 
CJEU revisited its ‘functions’ analysis in Bellure, holding for the first time that certain additional 
functions had their own independent protection under Article 5(1)(a) even if there was no damage to 
the ‘essential function’. The ‘functions’ protected under Article 5(1)(a) were said to include: 
 
not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the 
origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing 
the quality of the goods or services in question and those of communication, investment or 
advertising. 41  
 
In de-linking Article 5(1)(a) from damage to the ‘essential function’, Bellure extended the scope of 
protection conferred on all registered marks via Article 5(1)(a) very considerably. This extension of 
protection makes it a prima facie infringement to use a mark referentially to identify the trade mark 
owner’s own goods, even if not damaging the message of origin of the mark, if damage to any of the 
other functions is shown. Given that these other functions, particularly the ‘advertising’ and 
‘investment’ functions, seem to protect brand-related characteristics, major concerns were expressed 
at the risk of stifling freedom of expression and free competition, potentially barring the effective 
and open flow of product or price reviews, comparisons or critiques relating to trade marked goods 
or services even if honest, accurate and useful to consumers. Bellure has been described as the 
‘supernova’ which collapsed the registered trade mark into ‘a black hole that absorbs all the 
communication surrounding it’. 42 It was against this highly charged backdrop that the CJEU came to 
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address, in Google France and Interflora in particular, whether the advertisers’ use of marks in their 
keywords caused damage to any of the trade mark functions now protected by Bellure. 
 
Google France and Interflora – defending and developing the ‘functions’ analysis 
 
A significant problem for the CJEU in trying to deal with the new additional ‘functions’ in the 
keywords cases must have been the lack of detail in Bellure. The passage quoted above represents 
almost the sum total of the CJEU’s comments on the new protected functions. No explanation is 
given of how these particular additional functions have come to be identified, what each comprises 
or the rationale for their protection. All that is offered by way of justification for the ruling is a brief 
comparison of the scope of Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) in light of the description in  Recital 10 TMD 
of Article 5(1)(a) protection as ‘absolute’; unhelpfully, however, the CJEU’s view conflicts with the 
generally-accepted reading of that Recital. 43 Otherwise, in Bellure the CJEU identified no relevant 
provision in the TMD or CTMR identifying or implying the protection of these functions, nor any 
justification based on their overall scheme or purpose. This is problematic since the CJEU’s decision 
rides roughshod over the overall scheme of Article 5 TMD, the detail of which indicates that the 
legislator’s intention was that any protection for the ‘additional functions’ of a mark should be 
reserved only to marks ‘with a reputation’ entitled to protection under Article 5(2), the transposition 
of which into national laws was explicitly left as optional at the discretion of Member States. 44   
 
Although Google France and the cases immediately thereafter made no attempt to revisit Bellure, the 
CJEU returned to this in Interflora having found itself in what the Advocate General called ‘a rather 
challenging position’ given the continuing criticism of Bellure from commentators and judges. 45 
However, the CJEU’s defence of Bellure in Interflora does little to advance the legitimacy of the 
‘additional functions’ in terms of grounding them in the TMD/CTMR, the Court effectively 
repeating at only slightly greater length the points made in Bellure. 46 We are therefore no better off in 
terms of understanding the justification for this extension of Article 5(1)(a) protection. This is 
unfortunate given the difficulty of applying new rulings to different scenarios without any clear sense 
of their rationale, not to mention the contentious nature of the claims against the majority of 
advertisers in the keywords cases who were, in effect, using the registered marks as keywords to 
target and thereby render more effective otherwise entirely lawful promotional activity, with possible 
benefits to consumers as well.  
 
These difficulties continue into the discussions about the three particular functions considered in 
Google France and Interflora.  The first function examined in the keyword context was the ‘essential 
function’. Although Arsenal (above) was well-established, in Google France the CJEU altered the test 
for damage to the ‘essential function’ significantly. This is said to be a question for national courts to 
assess taking into account that: 
 
The function of indicating the origin of the mark is adversely affected if the ad does not 
enable normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users, or enables them only with 
difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate from the 
proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the 
contrary, originate from a third party (see, to that effect, Céline, paragraph 27 and the case law 
cited) 
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such that there will be infringement where the advertisement, ‘while not suggesting the existence of 
an economic link’, is ‘vague’ to such an extent that Internet users cannot ascertain from the 
sponsored link and advertising message whether the advertiser and trade mark owner are linked. 47  
In other words, silence may be enough to infringe in the absence of active disclaimer of a connection 
with the trade mark owner. This new test, effectively repeated verbatim in the subsequent keywords 
cases, constitutes a shift ‘from proof of likely confusion by the trademark owner to an obligation on 
all parties to secure market transparency when using keyword advertising services’, creating what has 
also been called a ‘novel duty of transparency’ which it will be difficult for advertisers to discharge. 48 
However, the justification given by the CJEU for this change is non-existent: the case law cited by 
the CJEU in support (Céline) does not deal with the point in issue. 49 There is no wider attempt to 
justify this development textually, purposively or otherwise.  
 
Although the CJEU in Interflora subsequently clarified that just because ‘some’ Internet users may 
have difficulty grasping whether there is a connection between advertiser and trade mark owner does 
not mean that infringement will necessarily follow, the CJEU has declined to answer any question 
referred to it relating to the effect on the ‘essential function’ of the on-screen positioning or labelling 
of sponsored advertisements. 50 There are many ways in which the search engine’s presentation of 
sponsored advertising could affect consumer understanding: not only in the positioning and labelling 
of sponsored advertisements, but also, for example, in any explanatory text or by the display of pop-
up previews of the advertised webpages or similar functionality. Search engine providers can also 
control the width of functions equivalent to Google’s ‘broad-match’ tool. It appears that the CJEU 
has been careful not to embark upon consideration of any matters that might bring the provider back 
into the frame in liability terms: were any issues relating to positioning, labelling or similar explicitly 
part of the Court’s infringement analysis, the provider would inevitably be implicated as the entity 
which exclusively controls these features. 
 
The two other ‘functions’ considered in the keywords cases were the ‘advertising’ and ‘investment’ 
functions. The approach here is also problematic. The advertising function is defined by the CJEU in 
Google France as the function of acting ‘as a factor in sales promotion or… an instrument of 
commercial strategy’ and the ‘investment function’ in Interflora as the function of ‘acquir[ing] or 
preserv[ing] a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty’. 51 Both of these 
definitions are vague and there is no attempt to provide any justification for either, whether from the 
language, scheme or purpose of the TMD or CTMR, case law or otherwise.  
 
For both, it is also unclear when damage occurs. For the ‘advertising’ function, we are told in Google 
France that ‘certain repercussions’, not defined, are acceptable and that there is in any event no 
damage in keyword advertising because: 
 
when internet users enter the name of a trade mark as a search term, the home and 
advertising page of the proprietor of that mark will appear in the list of the natural results, 
usually in one of the highest positions on that list. That display, which is, moreover, free of 
charge, means that the visibility to internet users of the goods or services of the proprietor of 
the trade mark is guaranteed. 52 
 
This finding of fact on the ‘guaranteed’ visibility of the trade mark owner’s own website has been 
described as ‘staggering’. 53  In apparent response to such criticism, the CJEU in Interflora reiterated 
that there is no damage to the advertising function but this time on a differently-expressed  basis. 54 
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We are left not knowing which of the two versions of the test for damage to the advertising function 
–from Google France or from Interflora – is to be applied, what are the implications of ‘non-visibility’ in 
natural search results or how damage to the advertising function is to be assessed in other contexts. 
Uncertainties also arise in relation to assessment of damage to the ‘investment function’, said in 
Interflora to be actionable if ‘substantially’ interfered with but not if only ‘some consumers’ switch to 
competitor products or if the defender’s activities merely make the trade mark owner ‘adapt its 
efforts to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting consumers’, all matters which are left 
for the national courts to assess. 55 It is not clear why the ‘quality’ and ‘communication’ functions 
were not considered. 
 
What are the broader issues underlying the CJEU’s approach to the ‘functions’ analysis? 
It has been noted that:  
 
Where, or to the extent that, a strongly teleological approach to interpretation predominates, 
it is the validity or soundness of the teloi that justifies the interpretation and the decision 
rather than the wording of the text and an attempt to decipher what it says. 56 
 
While the CJEU has effected major developments in trade mark infringement through its case law in 
the past, those developments have been fully reasoned by the Court with a strong explanation of the 
basis for the decision in the language, scheme and purpose of the TMD and CTMR. 57 Unlike the 
difficulties over the term ‘use’ discussed above which stem from the TMD and CTMR themselves, 
the difficulties of the CJEU’s current ‘functions’ analysis flow from the lack of a clear teloi in its own 
judgment in Bellure. It has been suggested that the protection in Bellure of the new additional 
functions was motivated more by a wish to procure a finding of infringement in that case. 58 In such 
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that subsequent attempts to apply Bellure have strayed further 
into confusing judicial creativity.  
 
In the ‘functions’ analysis, the CJEU has now departed so far from the language, scheme and 
purpose of the TMD and CTMR, making no attempt in Google France and Interflora even to refer back 
to these instruments in developing the new functions, that it is difficult to say that it is ‘interpreting’ 
them in these cases. It seems inevitable that case law building on these aspects of Bellure, Google France 
and Interflora will be similarly unfounded in the TMD or CTMR, creating a vicious circle of further 
uncertainty for market actors and national courts and further Article 267 references.  This is highly 
concerning when the legal, economic and social policy justifications of expanding trade mark 
protection in this way are much contested. 59 In the meantime, the potentially damaging effects of 
these developments are magnified in the digital environment: the wider the range of different uses of 
a mark captured by Article 5(1)(a), the broader the types of information exchange which may be 
barred, from content on search engines and online market places to social networks, content-sharing 
sites, price comparison sites, review sites, discussion fora and blogs.  
 
It is also hard to discern an overall direction in the CJEU’s approach to the ‘functions’ analysis in the 
keyword cases in terms of either promoting or regulating online information exchange. Outcomes are 
unpredictable – after all, unauthorised use of a trade mark in a competitor’s keyword, resulting in 
greater profile and exposure for the competitor’s advertisement, might well have been regarded the 
paradigm of damage to the advertising function. However, in reaching the opposite view, the CJEU 
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even went so far as to make findings of fact which are neither capable of being sustained by the 
evidence nor within the Court’s mandate under Article 267.  Google France and Interflora show a 
possible move, although by no means a clear one, to rein in some of the effects of Bellure, the 
difficult and overlapping rulings in Google France and Interflora  on the ‘advertising’ and ‘investment’ 
functions appearing to stem from a desire to balance, at least to some degree, the different policy and 
stakeholder interests in keyword advertising but without the tools in Article 5(1)(a) to allow that 
balancing to be explicit and without, most importantly it would seem, reversing the Bellure decision; 
however, the concealing of these new and mixed normative directions within what purports to be an 
exercise of interpretation is unclear and unhelpful. 60 In the meantime, we are little wiser as to when 
these functions may be damaged and the new Google France test for damage to the essential function 
increases, rather than decreases, the risk of infringement for advertisers. There are already signs of 
divergence between Member States: the new Google France test of damage to the origin function of the 
mark has since been applied with strikingly different outcomes, with rulings against the advertisers in 
Austria and both for and against the advertisers in France, Germany and the Netherlands. 61 
 
The need for comprehensive and forward-looking legislative intervention  
 
The two features of the keywords cases discussed in this paper – infringing ‘use’ and the ‘functions’ 
analysis - reveal two sides to the seemingly-intractable dilemma in which European trade mark law 
currently finds itself. On the one hand, it faces challenges arising from new technologies which the 
TMD and CTMR are simply not equipped to resolve in a clear-cut way. On the other hand, it faces 
unpredictable case law developments stemming from the CJEU itself but which, after Interflora, we 
cannot expect the CJEU to reverse. 62 
 
It has been suggested that European trade mark law may be best developed by finding a greater role 
for the national courts, exercising restraint in referring questions to the CJEU and allowing more 
time for the law to develop across Member States. 63 It is submitted, however, that leaving matters to 
national courts - or even to the CJEU - is not a viable solution to the problems discussed in this 
paper.  The keywords references have created many new questions, as well as leaving a number of 
issues to the national courts. The position on these various matters is not acte clair.  All have the 
potential to generate further preliminary references, but it is not responsive to the needs of market 
actors to leave them hanging in what has been called the ‘tyranny of the unknown’ for as long as it 
may take for divergence to emerge at national level, be referred again to the CJEU, return to the 
national courts and for the cycle to continue. 64  
 
It is, in any event, appropriate to see preliminary references as ‘a mechanism for discourse between 
Member States, the CJEU, and the Union institutions’. 65 It is, of course, accepted that there are 
uncertainties as to future technologies, business models and consumer and infringer behaviours. As 
noted in the introduction to this paper, however, it is also clear that revision of the TMD and CTMR 
is on its way. 66 It is therefore essential to take this opportunity to ensure that that amendment of the 
TMD and CTMR is sufficiently comprehensive and forward-looking to modernise the law of 
infringement in a way which rebalances the law-making process, relieving the CJEU of the role of de 
facto legislator at the cutting edge of trade mark infringement.  
 
The steps needed to redress this balance are only partially addressed by the Max Planck Study. 
Overall, the Study says surprisingly little about the Internet or the challenges of future technologies. 
The ‘own commercial communication’ test is not analysed and, while it is noted that ‘[i]t seems 
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obvious that all IP laws, whether at the European Union level or at the national level, should provide 
for harmonised rules for third-party liability’, no specific proposals on secondary liability are made in 
view of the Commission’s currently on-going review of the IP Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC 
(‘IPED’). At the same time, while the Study recommends reversing the extension of the ‘functions’ 
analysis in Bellure, it is proposed that an amended version of the currently optional protection under 
Article 5(5) TMD against uses of marks ‘other than for distinguishing goods or services’ be made 
mandatory in all national laws. It is also recommended that referential use of a mark in commercial 
communications referring to the trade mark owner’s goods or in the context of commercialising such 
goods or services must be compliant with ‘honest commercial practices’, with new ‘honest referential 
use’ and ‘fair use’ defences proposed. 67  
 
All of this goes at most only part of the way to resolving the issues discussed in this paper.  As 
regards intermediaries, while the IPED does provide for no-fault injunctions against off- and online 
intermediaries to prohibit continuation of infringements committed using their services and, subject 
to Article 15 ECD and the balancing of certain factors, to prevent further infringements, 68 it does 
not deal with substantive intellectual property laws. Even with review of the IPED underway, if the 
definition of infringing ‘use’ and questions over primary/secondary liability discussed above are not 
addressed within amendment of the TMD and CTMR, the opaque position discussed in this paper 
and potential for consequent further references on these issues will persist.  These matters therefore 
need to be resolved within the TMD and CTMR. Work to establish the preferred position should tie 
in with the Commission’s current consultation on the ECD ‘safe-harbour’ provisions and the extent 
to which they should extend to search engines, auction sites, social networks and so on, the outcome 
of which could have an impact on the preferred approach to the TMD and CTMR. 69 Greater 
reflection, consultation and evidence is needed on the range of trade mark-related information 
disseminated online, how it is disseminated, perceived and acted on by Internet users and how 
intermediaries may become implicated at different levels, their interests in and control over the 
allegedly infringing activity and the nature and extent of their contributions to any damage caused. 70  
 
As for the ‘functions’ analysis and related issues, it is not clear what would be the cumulative effect 
of the Study’s proposals on infringement, the recommendation on Article 5(5) TMD needing 
particular evaluation given the risk of new adverse impacts. 71  While it is to be expected that the 
Commission will, given its past submissions to the CJEU, endorse the recommendation to reverse 
the Bellure ‘functions’ analysis, thereby ending some of the difficulties discussed above, the Study’s 
proposals do not tackle the fresh questions arising from the Google France test for damage to the 
origin function. This is despite its implications for far wider-ranging forms of online information 
exchange than just keyword advertising. This issue therefore also needs deeper examination, 
evidence-gathering and consultation in order to adopt an infringement test which resolves growing 
national divergence, is appropriate for the digital age and is capable of being applied across different 
scenarios in the future.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Through analysis of the keywords case law, this paper has examined the role of the CJEU within the 
European trade mark law-making process. It has been shown that, driven by policy considerations, 
the CJEU has acted creatively to develop the law of infringement in ways no longer supported by the 
TMD or CTMR and likely to cause continued future uncertainty and further preliminary references. 
It is contended that it is only by legislative intervention to tackle underlying policy questions and 
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issues which will clearly face trade mark infringement going forward that this cycle of uncertainty will 
be broken. This calls for broad consultation and evidence-gathering as a basis for more 
comprehensive and forward-looking legislative intervention than has yet been proposed in the 
current work on amendment of the TMD and CTMR.  Such legislative intervention, which it is 
hoped will be forthcoming in the Commission’s proposals, will be critical in restoring balance to the 
European trade mark law-making process.  
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